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Abstract
Centralization and decentralization are key concepts in debates that focus on the (anti)democratic character of digital
societies. Centralization is understood as the control over communication and data flows, and decentralization as giv-
ing it (back) to users. Communication and media research focuses on centralization put forward by dominant digital me-
dia platforms, such as Facebook and Google, and governments. Decentralization is investigated regarding its potential
in civil society, i.e., hacktivism, (encryption) technologies, and grass-root technology movements. As content-based me-
dia companies increasingly engage with technology, they move into the focus of critical media studies. Moreover, as
formerly nationally oriented companies now compete with global media platforms, they share several interests with
civil society decentralization agents. Based on 26 qualitative interviews with leading media managers, we investigate
(de)centralization strategies applied by content-oriented media companies. Theoretically, this perspective on media com-
panies as agents of (de)centralization expands (de)centralization research beyond traditional democratic stakeholders by
considering economic actors within the “global informational ecosystem” (Birkinbine, Gómez, &Wasko, 2017).We provide
a three-dimensional framework to empirically investigate (de)centralization. From critical media studies, we borrow the
(de)centralization of data and infrastructures, frommedia business research, the (de)centralization of content distribution.
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1. Introduction
The digital era is having painful consequences for me-
dia companies such as publishers or broadcasters whose
core business is providing content. “It hurts”, says one
of the contributors to the study presented in this pa-
per [3]. The interviewee, CEO of an Austrian newspaper-
publishing house, refers to the radical, transformative
process to which content-oriented media companies are
exposed. Their traditional subscription- and advertising-
based business models, oriented toward national me-
dia systems, are expiring. An important reason is that
media companies such as Facebook or Google, whose
business models focus on technologies and technology
infrastructure and whose platforms cut across national
regulations, are winning market shares, especially in ad-
vertising. Media business and journalism studies have
identified the various stages in trial-and-error attempts
by content-based media companies to adapt or reinvent
content monetization in a digital age. The initial idea
to provide free content on websites and sell advertis-
ing space has failed (Bakker, 2008). Paid content, a then-
emerging model, was accepted by users only in excep-
tional cases (Herbert & Thurman, 2007).
At the present time, we can identify three major
strategies for dealing with the dominance of digital plat-
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forms in media markets. One is to regard content as the
carrier of product promotion with, for instance, native
advertising playing a major role (Matteo & Dal Zotto,
2015). This strategy aims to solve, for instance, the prob-
lem of increased ad blocker usage. In a second strategy,
research observes a qualitative shift toward using and de-
signing infrastructures. Companies increasingly engage
in building their own databases and technological inter-
faces, e.g. The Intercept (Mullin, 2015). Finally, media
companies increasingly engage in national and transna-
tional lobbyism in order to support political efforts to
regain control of data and distribution (e.g. Arsenault &
Castells, 2008). Contemporary strategies, thus, clearly do
reach beyond the level of content creation, as they refer
equally to the design, shape, and development of (me-
dia) technologies and technology infrastructures.
Content-based media companies, therefore, qualify
as a subject of research when regarding agents that act
on media (Kubitschko, 2017). Acting on media denotes
actively aiming at shaping technology (infrastructures)
that is crucial for everyday communication by contribut-
ing to technology design or discourse. Thus far, critical
media research as well as research in the area of me-
dia practice has placed a focus on agents that belong to
the citizenry, such as civic hacking as lobbyism (Coleman,
2011; Kubitschko, 2015) or grass-root technology move-
ments (Milan & Hintz, 2013), or on “digital media giants”
(Birkinbine et al., 2017), on the other hand. With its fo-
cus on content-based media companies, this article ven-
tures into another thus far overlooked group of agents.
That is, our investigation departs from the insight that
these companies, challenged by considerable technolog-
ical change as well as the increasing market power of in-
fluential digital platforms such as Facebook and Google,
have every interest in engaging in shaping technology
and technology infrastructures. Yet though, they dispose
of considerable influence and eventually the potential
and pressure to shape technology and infrastructures.
Moreover, as their economic survival might depend on
it, it is worth to consider their efforts to act on media.
Our argumentative starting point is that content-
based media companies are in a competitive struggle
with large digital platforms and that it is worth inves-
tigating their business strategies in relation to technol-
ogy and technology infrastructures. A helpful distinc-
tion for grasping this relationship is that of centraliza-
tion and decentralization, both used in critical media re-
search. Centralization refers to the concentration of con-
trol over technology and technology infrastructures in
the hands of dominant media platforms or governments
(Dencik, Hintz, & Carey, 2017; Helmond, 2015; Mathew,
2016), while decentralization denotes giving control of
data (back) to citizens. In the following, we will explore
this analytical perspective and aim to describe content-
based media companies as agents of decentralization
or centralization. To this end, we combine perspectives
from critical media studies with insights frommedia busi-
ness and management. Both contribute to the devel-
opment of a three-dimensional framework for assess-
ing (de)centralization patterns in media-company busi-
ness strategies, which is applied to data from a research
project on the cross-border activities of media compa-
nies. In particular, we refer to qualitative interviews with
26 leading managers from Europe- and US-based media
companies whose core business is content in contrast
to technology.
2. (De)Centralization: A Techno-Economic Framework
In communication andmedia studies, the issue of decen-
tralization has gained increasing importance against the
backdrop of contemporary “surveillance societies” (Lyon,
2011), a term coined by sociologist David Lyon for soci-
eties characterized as monitoring any kind of everyday
communicative activity. The concept is a key anchor for
a body of communication and media research that crit-
ically discusses control over data and data flows in dig-
ital societies (Hintz, 2014). Herein, control over data is
a key resource for political and economic power. While
centralization refers to the control over data by govern-
ments or digitalmedia platforms likeGoogle or Facebook,
decentralization denotes giving that control to users, or
rather citizens. Thus, centralization by commercialized
digital platforms, in cooperation with governments, is
described as the status quo, whereas decentralization
refers to civic stakeholders’ attempts to acquire control
over data.
Both concepts scrutinize the commodification of ev-
eryday communication. Researchers critically assess indi-
vidual user control of data (e.g., via encryption) in con-
trast to more democratic and citizen-based models of
data sharing (Fuchs, 2017, p. 437; Gürses, 2014). Fol-
lowing Agre, centrality is given when digital infrastruc-
tures are “administered by a centralized authority…and
if…global coordination is required to change them” (Agre,
2003, p. 40). Digital media platforms are unanimously
criticized for their practice of centralizing communication
and data flows and their lack of respect regarding privacy
(Helmond, 2015; Hintz, 2014, p. 360; Kubitschko, 2015,
p. 78; Milan, 2015, p. 3) while, at the same time, creat-
ing a discourse of decentralized empowering of platform
technologies (Gillespie, 2010). Facebook, for instance, is
described as “themost subtle, cheapest, and best surveil-
lance technology available” (Nadir, 2012). From a polit-
ical economy perspective, yet pointing to a similar ar-
gument, Christian Fuchs (2017) critically analyses Face-
book’s practices of turning user access into a commod-
ity by centralizing data analysis. Rieder and Sire (2014,
p. 208) stress how Google has overcome “the limits
which physical space imposes on the centralization of in-
formation services”.
Decentralization, in contrast, is tied to the idea of a
more democratic Internet. This is the case when its ap-
plications “arise in a locality and propagate throughout
the population” (Agre, 2003, p. 40). Decentralization is
defined as giving control of data and technology to citi-
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zens. In the literature we find only minor disagreement
on its value, if at all it concerns the necessary degree
of decentralization. While some regard decentrality as a
key feature of the early Internet representing an ideal
digital-infrastructure design (Hintz, 2014, p. 352), oth-
ers contend that the decentralized Internet is a “myth”
(Mathew, 2016). Based on a review of the history of the
Internet, Mathew elucidates that it was and always will
be hierarchically organized. His argument is that a cer-
tain degree of centralization is necessary to ensure po-
litical control over digital infrastructures. Agre’s earlier
considerations sound similar. He highlights that the In-
ternet has “a reputation as a model of decentralization”,
although “its institutions and architecture nonetheless
have many centralized aspects” (Agre, 2003, p. 40).
Three groups of stakeholders are studied as agents
of decentralization. The first group comprises civil soci-
ety lobbyists who inform the public, as well as govern-
ments, regarding the dominant role of digital media play-
ers by means of hacking and informing (Coleman, 2011).
A prominent example is the Chaos Computer Club (Ku-
bitschko, 2015). A second group comprises encryption-
technology activists, implying the structural analysis of
encryption technology. Here, the focus is on providing se-
cure, i.e., anonymous, spaces of communication to tech-
nology users (Gürses, 2014). A third group can be char-
acterized as system-opposing civil society actors, creat-
ing alternative digital infrastructures and “adopting a tac-
tical repertoire of circumvention” (Hintz, 2014, p. 353),
who bypass generally applied systems by developing al-
ternative communication platforms that are not linked to
the dominant digital infrastructure (Milan & Hintz, 2013).
This, by and large, demonstrates that (de)centralization
in critical media studies is either focusing on increasing
control of data flows by (commodified) surveillance or-
ganizations or by empowered, technology-savvy citizens.
While the former exert control over massive sets of data,
the latter represent an elite with limited influence on a
large scale.
As these agents engage in shaping and debating tech-
nologies and technology infrastructures, they act onme-
dia.We argue that it is worth investigating content-based
media companies by applying the same perspective. Act-
ing on media “entails the direct engagement with tech-
nical systems and devices as well as the articulation of
viewpoints, interests, experiences and viewpoints” (Ku-
bitschko, 2017, p. 5) that are related. In contrast, act-
ing with media denotes the use or impact of media.
Content-based media companies are defined as com-
panies whose business model is based on the produc-
tion and trade of text or audio-visual content. We have
in mind newspaper, book, and special-interest outlet
publishers as well as TV and movie content producers
and traders. Within these companies, technology plays
a subordinate yet growing role in supporting the provi-
sion of content and increasing added value. In contrast,
technology-based companies regard platforms, data col-
lection and analysis, and the development of technolog-
ical solutions as their core business. Content is predomi-
nantly provided by users, whichmight as well be content-
based media companies.
The distinction between content- and technology-
basedmedia companies provides a useful analytical map
for characterizing media companies’ business strategies
whose core business is content and who engage in-
creasingly with technologies and technological infras-
tructures. Following critical media research, we regard
Facebook and Google as technology-based companies
that clearly centralize media markets (Helmond, 2015;
Mathew, 2016). That is not to say that technology-based
companies generally centralize the global informational
ecosystem. Yet Facebook and Google represent key ref-
erence platforms for the identification of centralization
among content-based media companies. While, for a
long time, media companies seemed to merely lag be-
hind digital development, bemoaning the increasingmar-
ket power of digital platforms, they are now continually
developing new business models. With reference to cen-
tralization, we want to know whether these adapt to or
copy Facebook’s and Google’s business models and thus
tend to support their influential market position. The fol-
lowing quote illustrates that there is an inevitable and
subordinate dependence on digital platforms:
News organizations are increasingly dependent on
Google and a handful of other powerful tech firms
for the tools and platforms needed to reach their au-
dience. They also are increasingly vulnerable to the
changes the tech firms are introducing. The shift to
mobile, for example, is making news an ever-more ex-
pensive arena in which to operate, but it is not yet
producing the kind of new revenues to back up news
organizations that will allow them to support those
expenses. (Sasseen, Olmstead, & Mitchell, 2013)
Despite these tendencies to centralize, business rela-
tions between content-based media companies and dig-
ital platforms are more complex. By the same token, the
above quote could be read in the sense that content-
based media companies are likely to be agents of de-
centralization.Media business researchers point out that
digital media platforms dominate and control the ad-
vertising market by increasing user access and scope.
While digitization forces them to provide their content
online, they struggle for new ways to monetize it. Ear-
lier business models based on subscription and adver-
tising that flanks coverage or subscription, are increas-
ingly called into question, not least by these digital plat-
forms. From a decentralization perspective, one could
argue that content-based media companies share a crit-
ical perspective on digital media platforms. Their joint
intent must be to limit Facebook’s, Google’s, and other
platforms’ rigorous access to users and data in order to
regain control of their core businesses.
Taking into account that content-based media
companies most likely perform as both centralization
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and decentralization agents, we suggest considering
(de)centralization with regard to three dimensions; that
is, the normative implications of both notions are pushed
to the background. A first dimension concerns control
over data and data gathering. Critical media studies
demonstrate that understandingwho controls data flows
is paramount for investigating centralization and decen-
tralization in critical digital society and technology stud-
ies (see also Fuchs, 2017). As content-based media com-
panies will hardly intend to give control of data to users,
wemust rather imply that the question arises of who can
exert control over user access and data in order to com-
modify them. This perspective regards both technology-
and content-based media companies as competitors
within a global informational ecosphere (Birkinbine et
al., 2017), with the former in a central position and the
latter, to a greater or lesser extent, located at the pe-
riphery. It also pays tribute to the fact that digital me-
dia platforms can increasingly be regarded as “content
workers”, as they exert a gatekeeper function by filter-
ing content published on their platform. Recently, we
have seen many examples showing that Facebook and
Google edit and filter content provided on their plat-
forms (Hintz, 2014).
Critical media researchers might argue that capitalist
agentswill not contribute to sustainable democratic solu-
tions to surveillance (Fuchs, 2017, p. 442). Equally, schol-
ars investigating media diversity contend that highly
competitive deregulated media markets will not result
in a diversified media market (Jakubowicz, 2013). For in-
stance, Just (2009, p. 111) holds that this might lead to
an increase of nichemarket products but not cover all so-
cietal groups thatwould be considered in a politically reg-
ulated context. We do share these critical concerns but
not their radical implications. Mathew argues that the
idea of a decentralized Internet is a myth, as even at the
beginning there were centralized structures to control
communication flow (Mathew, 2016). Similarly, current
models of Internet governance design multi-stakeholder
processes, including both civil and economic actors (Hof-
mann, Katzenbach, & Gollatz, 2014), “a complex ecology
of interdependent structures” with “a vast array of for-
mal and informalmechanismsworking across amultiplic-
ity of sites” (Hintz, 2014, p. 351). Within these central-
ized and decentralized structures, Facebook and Google
indeed play a “central” role. As media environments are
constantly deregulated and digital media platforms by
and large circumvent political regulation, we thus inves-
tigate the potential of media companies to counterbal-
ance centralized digital media platforms’ data collection
regarding regional or local data centres by as many dif-
ferent agents as possible.
Building on this perspective, we introduce addi-
tional dimensions of (de)centralization. With reference
to the research of McKelvey (2011) or, more recently,
Helmond (2015), which deepens our perspective on
data collection, we introduce a second dimension of
(de)centralization. These authors place a focus on data
accumulation by global digital-technology companies
while also considering their business models regarding
technological infrastructures as a moment of centraliza-
tion. Helmond, in particular, has underlined the close
relationship between building “decentralizing platform
features” and “recentralizing platform-ready data” (Hel-
mond, 2015, p. 8). That is, businessmodels are related to
technological infrastructures. Digital media companies
build platforms that decentralize in the web in order to
realize accessibility for as many users as possible. Fol-
lowing Gillespie (2010, p. 352), using the platform no-
tion allows digital media platforms to create a discourse
of equal access while exercising extensive economies of
scale. Platform is defined as “a ‘raised level surface’ de-
signed to facilitate some activity that will subsequently
take place” (Gillespie, 2010, p. 350).
The technological infrastructure is the companies’
key resource. This infrastructure is “programmable”,
which describes the potential for customization by ex-
ternal developers and its reuse by various business
models and applications (Andreessen, 2007). The plat-
form’s key technologies are application-programming in-
terfaces (APIs), which are structures on which to build
software applications. At the same time, they allow for
the exchange of content and data created across these
applications. The platform, on the one hand, provides
applications for users that can look very different and
can vary across economic and cultural contexts; yet on
the other hand, its technological foundation is a single
software infrastructure built with the aim of creating a
large database.
Translated to a market perspective, Facebook, for in-
stance, is “an example of amulti-sided platform that con-
nects users, advertisers, and third-party developers and
experiences network effects where value increases for
all parties as more people use it” (Helmond, 2015, p. 2).
Facebook is an outstanding example of this specific inter-
play of “decentralizing platform features and recentraliz-
ing platform-ready data” (Helmond, 2015, p. 8) for com-
modification. Facebook offers an interface that invites
new software applications and integrates existing ones.
Not least, it increases benefits for users (i.e. networking),
the more they use it for everyday communication. This,
altogether, allows us to consider (de)centralization with
regard to its infrastructural foundation. Hence, we will
askwhether content-basedmedia companies build appli-
cations that align with digital-media platform interfaces,
eventually to profit from the platform’s visibility among
users, or concentrate on building their own or alternative
technological frameworks.
Finally, we refer to a third dimension of (de)centraliz-
ation that is rooted in the media-business literature and
centres on content distribution. Traditionally, media pro-
duction has beenmuch less concentrated thanmedia dis-
tribution. Depending on the media technology in ques-
tion, concentration on the distribution level is higher
(fewer film distributors than film producers) or even
reaches a natural monopoly, for instance, in the case of
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cable television or, in some countries, magazine distribu-
tion to news stalls (May, 2012).1 Disadvantages of this
centralization are regularly addressed by imposing must-
carry rules or indiscriminate access to distribution (see
Bernstein, 1986; Woldt, 2002). Furthermore, concentra-
tion or centralization in one media-distribution technol-
ogy can be counterbalanced with and within other me-
dia technologies.
The digitization of media distribution changes the
situation. The Internet is content- and format-agnostic
and thus can more or less replace and incorporate all
other media distribution technologies. Therefore, a digi-
tal platform that centralizes content and communication
is much more all encompassing on an overall scale than
centralized platforms in other media distribution tech-
nologies have been. In some sense, the discussion about
net neutrality (Economides, 2008) mirrors access regula-
tion in traditional media-distribution technologies. How-
ever, centralization does not happen only on the level of
the broadband connection but also on the level of digital-
media platforms such as Facebook or Google. Thus, even
a non-discriminatory network does not hamper central-
ization. Strong network effects on such platforms create
winner-take-all markets (Noe & Parker, 2005), but they
do not justify a natural monopoly. Media companies as
producers would still benefit from a multitude of distri-
bution options.
For legacy media organizations, these universal
digital-distribution platforms are a boon and a bane at
the same time. Using the APIs offered by the platforms,
they can reach large audiences without creating their
own infrastructure. However, their grip on this enlarged
reach is rather limited. The platforms will not share all
the information they have on users, while they will se-
cure a large part of the potential advertising revenue.
With Facebook’s instant articles or Google’s accelerated
mobile pages, the two companies offer to host content
and allow for superior digital distribution. This renders
media companies dependent and creates newbarriers to
market entry. Economies of scale in the analogue world
meant that the price of a printing press posed a market-
entry barrier in the newspaper business (Picard, 2015).
Economies of scale in the digital world mean centraliza-
tion on digital media distribution platforms poses barri-
ers to entry into the digital media market.
Having said this, we understand that an ongoing cen-
tralization of the global informational ecosphere occurs
if the content-basedmedia companies arrange their busi-
ness models with a view toward the dominant digital-
media platforms. Decentralization, in contrast, refers to
alternative or owned databases, infrastructures, and dis-
tribution channels. Regarding these three dimensions,
we will investigate business strategies as pursued by
content-oriented media companies with regard to the
three dimensions described earlier (data, platforms, and
distribution). Overall, the contribution of this approach
is to investigate whether content-oriented media com-
panies must be regarded as agents of centralization or
decentralization of the global informational ecosphere.
3. Research Questions and Methods
The above-introduced framework suggests a way to ap-
proach media companies as agents of (de)centralization.
Each of the three dimensions in the framework ad-
dresses a specific research question. With respect to
data, we ask whether and to what extent media com-
panies adapt to platform types of data collection to de-
sign their products. Then, we are interested in adaption
to digital platform interfaces or, in contrast, the creation
of alternative or independent infrastructures. Finally,
we want to find out more about the uses of distribu-
tion channels. Herein, decentralization refers to indepen-
dence from centralization for arranging business models
with a view toward Facebook, Google, and the like.
These research questions will be explored based on
a study of the cross-border activities of media compa-
nies (additional information about the research project
can be found in the acknowledgements). The issue of
centralization or decentralization is, thus, not addressed
directly. This is related to limitation and surplus at the
same time. Many questions that could have been asked
to further elucidate a company’s relationships with tech-
nology (infrastructures) remained unasked. Thus, while
the empirical study presented in this article is an aca-
demic side product, it points out that questions regard-
ing the relationship with digital platforms and technol-
ogy infrastructures are highly relevant to top-tier media
managers, as they emerge without being asked directly.
We used qualitative semi-structured interviews
(Cooper & Schindler, 2014; Patton, 2015) with 26 leading
media managers, responsible mostly for their respective
company’s engagement across borders, from content-
based media companies based in Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many, the UK, the US, the Netherlands, and Switzer-
land to address these (project-related) questions (for a
list of all interviewees, please see the Annex). The in-
terviews were conducted predominantly in face-to-face
situations, seven via Skype, and one by telephone. The
sampled companies represent a large variety in terms
of content (newspaper publishing, news agencies, book
publishing, TV/movie). Despite this diversity, all of the
interviewees reflected on their companies’ relationships
with global digital platforms.We did not aim to cover the
companies in terms of trade volume but rather aimed for
a variety of cross-border activities.
4. Content-Based Media Companies as Agents of
(De)Centralization
Above, we have demonstrated that the rise of Face-
book, Google, and the like poses a considerable chal-
lenge for content-basedmedia companies, as the former
dominate advertising markets, push technological inno-
1 For a critic on the theory of natural monopolies in media distribution, see DiLorenzo (1996).
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vation, and control data and, to some extent, distribu-
tion. The interviews underline how technology compa-
nies have shaped the media market considerably since
the 2000s. In a typical statement, Piet Vroman, CFO of
the Belgian newspaper companyDePersgroep, highlights
how Google and Facebook have pushed the economies
of scale: “Google entered, and Facebook entered, and
advertising revenues dropped heavily. And we learned
more and more, which was not that important in the
1990s, until by 2005, that scale became ever more im-
portant” [23]. Other interviewees put it similarly. In the
words of Axel Springer International’s then-president
Ralph Büchi, “in this new digital allocations battle with
the big…platforms…we will have no chance if there is
no prevention against their market power being used
to our clear disadvantage” [5]. These two quotes illus-
trate that leading content-based company managers see
the clear need to act. They express concerns regarding
nothing less than their economic survival. In this difficult
situation, the interviewees consider their engagement
with technology (infrastructures) as well as their rela-
tionships with centralized digital platforms. Approaches
to data, formats, and distribution that will be discussed
in greater detail in the following, must be understood
against this background.
4.1. Data
Access to data is a key resource for content-based media
companies in order to able to control the alignment be-
tween products and consumers’ needs. Yet control over
data remains largely with the digital media platforms. In
the interviews, we identify three general strategies to
deal with this problem; none aims at sharing data with
global media platforms, yet all three clearly follow com-
parable patterns. The first strategy refers to digital plat-
forms as a role model. That is, media companies con-
tend the need to adapt their business models to data-
collection strategies applied by Facebook, Google, and
the like. This is illustrated in the following quote by Time
Warner’s senior vice president:
We need to develop our data capabilities to better un-
derstand consumer needs…moving away from ratings,
which is really an outdated model, in a data-centric
world, so that we can…show advertisers not only that
they’re reaching eight million women in the ages of
18 to 34, but also that you’re reaching car buyers who
went to the concessionary the following day. So we re-
ally have to evolve themodel because that’s what our
competition is doing. [19]
Heading in the same direction, the chief financial offi-
cer of the Belgium newspaper-publishing house DePers-
groep states that digital media companies are “miles
ahead of us in terms of knowing your customer” [23].
DePersgroep initiated a project to generate valuable
data access. Based on a cooperative venture with other
Belgium-based media companies, the newspaper pub-
lisher tried to establish a central media ID that would
provide a single access to a broad media portfolio. The
intent of this platform was clearly to collect user data,
yet it failed, not because of the politician responsible
but, as the CFO underlines, because of one of the me-
dia companies.
A second strategy is to create global databases in
niche markets. Often, this strategy builds on already-
existing data or networks in traditional businesses. Man-
agers considering this option explore issue-specific data
that they retrieve from their particular areas of exper-
tise. An illustrative example is Elsevier; the scientific pub-
lisher uses journal and expertise databases to provide
analytical services to scientists (career and collaboration
planning), universities (strengthening profile) or govern-
ments (funding). Mark Siebert, Director of Engagement
Programs and Strategy, explicates that, very similar to
the role-model strategies, Elsevier wishes to “learn from
the people and their needs” [14], with a focus on cos-
mopolitan groups of scientists and universities. Then,
learning from these customers means creating a plat-
form thatwill play a key role in this field, at least for those
who can afford it. A similar example is that of special-
ist magazine publisher Vogel. The media company uses
contact networks and expertise from formerly printed
advertisement-based newsletters to build issue-specific
expert platforms and networks in very specific areas such
as trading old-fashioned spare parts or specific machines
for ceiling construction.
A third strategy for gaining control over data, finally,
is to create local data-product communities. This strat-
egy is applied by Tamedia, a Swiss publisher and com-
muter newspaper specialist. The Swiss paper 20Minutes
combines a strategy of community creation, data collec-
tion, and newspaper production. Content is published
throughout the day and favorite topics will appear in
the printed evening edition. Tamedia’s “strongest digital
competitors are Facebook and Google….It is not realistic
to compete with them” [9], says Managing Director Mar-
cel Kohler. Yet equally, Tamedia belongs to the category
of “social media” [9], as it provides a brand to engage
people within the 20Minutes community, where readers
communicate with the editors and with each other and
provide content and pictures. And, as Marcel Kohler con-
tends, “the vessel that keeps everything together is our
app” [9]. Even though 20 Minutes is a successful brand
in Luxembourg, Denmark, and other countries, it is a na-
tional concept, as the respective 20Minute communities
relate to national or local surroundings yet merge into
one database via the media company Tamedia.
With the limited number of media-company repre-
sentatives interviewed, these three strategies certainly
represent only a small fraction of content-based media
companies’ strategies for retrieving control of data. Yet
they illustrate that media companies have no access to
data collected by Facebook and Google, nor do they
explicitly contribute to digital platform data collection.
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Rather, content-basedmedia companies seek avenues of
independent data gathering. For citizens, this is not nec-
essarily good news, as they can expect a multiplicity of
databases where their individual data is stored. Similarly,
taking a global, informational-ecosphere perspective, we
can contend that these and similar business strategies
would generate amultiplicity of data centers. This would,
from the perspective of the interviewees, at best include
some European data compactions.
4.2. Infrastructure
We have argued that technology-based media compa-
nies provide programmable platforms. That is, they pro-
vide an interface to which external developers can link.
Alternatively, digital media companies can acquire ex-
ternal applications and add them to their interface. Hel-
mond has demonstrated that this programmability refers
to platforms with centralized data collection and decen-
tralized applications. While data centralization has al-
ready been discussed, in this section, we want to offer
an idea of whether or not content-based media com-
panies link to digital media platforms and, if so, how.
In particular, we are interested in whether, in their ev-
eryday workflows, media companies adapt to dominant
platforms or aim to establish other technological struc-
tures. The following illustrates that both apply. Media
companies profit from applying existing technological so-
lutions but equally consider the advantages of remain-
ing independent.
Numerous content-based media companies clearly
favor the application of technology-provided dominant
media platforms. ITV Studios Managing Director Ella
Umansky, for instance, contends that secure data trans-
fer is crucial for selling TV content across the world: “If
you have problemswith delivery, the file is the wrong for-
mat or gets corrupted whilst it’s being transferred, that
kills the deal, and that could then kill the relationship”
with the customer [15]. ITV studio, the biggest commer-
cial television network in the UK, depends on techno-
logical solutions provided by an internationally applica-
ble system for secure and direct transmission of content.
Based on this secure transmission, the company makes
money. CEO and Austrian newspaper publisher Kralinger
reports that his companyworks with Google editing tech-
nology, as it offers tailored solutions for editing-specific
requirements: “Alphabet (Google’s parent company) by
now offers very, very much technology, and during the
last 12 to 18 months also their will to work with publish-
ers in a constructive way has considerably increased” [2].
Beyond secure and well-aligned technologies, digital me-
dia platforms offer solutions for reducing costs within
everyday business. Book publisher Diogenes managing
director, for instance, refers to the fact that using digi-
tal technology solutions provided by dominant platforms
can bring about financial savings yet calls for additional
financial investment in the beginning [4].
At the same time, the interviewees provide numer-
ous examples of not linking to programmable large dig-
ital platforms and express aspirations to do so in the
near future. Kralinger, the Austrian newspaper pub-
lisher, while using Google technology in its everyday
editing business, contends the need for European me-
dia companies to cooperate in order to advance Europe-
based editing system technology networks. From his
point of view, there is a clear increase in “conscious-
ness that we need to build an independent market in
Europe, which appeals against the big American com-
panies” [2]. He reports supporting experiments with an
open-source content-management system called Drupal.
Similarly, news agency APA’s CEO Clemens Pig puts for-
ward that “technology is a protective shield against com-
petitors” [3] and underlines the need to cooperate on a
European scale.
Beyond that, we find two other compelling ways
of not linking to dominant media platforms. One is to
equally provide a platform that is a programmable inter-
face. This is especially the case with companies that use
their traditional content-based business to turn it into
databases. Herein, the above-introduced example of El-
sevier may be illustrative. Elsevier is part of the UK RELX
group that, besides the scientific publisher, owns busi-
nesses such as financial services or an event agency. El-
sevier is part of the RELXGroup, a global provider of infor-
mation and analytics for professionals and business cus-
tomers across industries. Mark Siebert, leading Elsevier
manager, explains that information and analytics help
public administrations and scientists, among others, to
build strategies or support career decisions [14]. In con-
trast, other larger media companies with a diverse prod-
uct portfolio, such as Axel Springer or Thomson Reuters,
tend to opt for a second opportunity. Interviewees from
both companies contend that the investment in a co-
herent company-wide technological framework repre-
sents a high financial risk. Gonzalo Lissarrague, Thom-
son Reuter’s president, Global GrowthOrganization, says
that what is global is the professional network and the
knowledge, but “we don’t want to replicate or duplicate
the technology in every country” [17].
Therefore, in regard to infrastructure, we find that
content-based media companies’ links with digital me-
dia platforms are highly diverse. While some companies
measure the financial benefits of applying global plat-
form technology, many others attempt to link to alter-
native infrastructures; that is, they do not follow a co-
herent technology development strategy. In this sense,
we can hardly speak of content-driven media companies
as agents of centralization. Only some express a “struc-
tural pressure” to adapt to centralized infrastructures. In
contrast, we find numerous approaches for building their
own platforms or comments on conscious decisions to
not build a coherent technological infrastructure. Decen-
tralization references are remarkably present on a dis-
course level.
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4.3. Distribution
Finally, we are interested in the strategies media compa-
nies intend to apply regarding distribution. Drawing on
media business literature, we have argued that central-
ized distribution as provided by Facebook and Google are
a boonandabane at the same time. Content-basedmedia
companies face the dilemma of choosing between reach-
ing large audiences and losing control over data (and,
thereby, advertising revenue). It is, therefore, no surprise
that the business relationships of content-based media
companies with digital media platforms are complex from
a distribution perspective. In fact, as the following quote
by Bernhard Burgener, CEO of the Highlight Communica-
tions Group exemplifies, the interviewees clearly regard
Facebook and Google as exerting control over distribu-
tion: “For them [Silicon Valley elites], it was always the
platform, the distribution, and the client….Once you have
the customers and you have the distribution, you have the
business. This is fundamental” [8].
The following illustrates that a majority of content-
based media companies have accepted Facebook,
Google, and the like as key distributors of media con-
tent. However, not only do media companies depend
on the digital platforms; the platforms also depend on
the content provided by the media companies. Mo-
tor Presse representative Volker Breid, for example, a
special-interest publisher with a focus on cars and mo-
bility, underlines how crucial it is to be present via
Facebook, stating, “this is important to maintain rele-
vance” [13]. He further explains that preparing content
for distribution on Facebook has become an integral part
of the everyday production process. Also Swiss book pub-
lisher Diogenes, who has taken more time to digitalize
its product portfolio, is now available throughout the
platforms, “because this is what the authors want” [4].
Also another large German multimedia company’s strat-
egy, preferring to stay anonymous regarding this aspect,
aims at an adaptation to digital platform distribution,
stating that the company maintains a stable business re-
lationship with Google, Amazon, Facebook and the likes.
In this context, however, it is important to stress that
the content-based media companies are fully aware of
the advantage of “having the content” [4]. While visibil-
ity and reaching a large audience is not always profitable
for a newspaper business, book publishers and TV pro-
ducers can be in a far more comfortable position, which
is even more comfortable in the event that the respec-
tive media company disposes of alternative distribution
channels and can negotiate with digital media platforms.
Movie and TV content producer Story House, for exam-
ple, has just recently initiated a promising collaboration
with YouTube. Still, there are many other ways to pro-
duce and sell content. The same holds true in the case
of Bertelsmann. Amazon is an interesting partner from
an economic point of view, but it is not the only option.
Overall, our take on distribution reveals, once again,
a mixed picture. Many content-based media companies
reconsider their business models by trying to benefit
from collaboration with digital media platforms. The rev-
enue appearsmore attractive when there are alternative
distribution channels. At the same time, media compa-
nies are aware that digital media platforms cannot live
on user-generated content alone, but that they must de-
pend on professionally produced content as well. This
insight increasingly strengthens the media companies’
market power, yet always based on a relationship with
digital media platforms.
5. Conclusion
This study contends that content-based media compa-
nies act onmedia. They engage with and define business
strategies regarding technology (infrastructures). How-
ever, content-based media companies can neither be re-
garded as agents of decentralization nor centralization,
especially when applying a critical and citizen-oriented
perspective. The above insights have shown that content-
based media companies contribute to and push central-
ization processes pursued by Facebook, Google, and the
like. The above illustrates that, at first sight, content-
based media companies tend not to directly contribute
to the platforms’ data collection. Simultaneously the cen-
trality of digital technology and the analysis of big data
for the development of further media content-related
business is clearly underlined. Companies pursue cen-
tralization in two regards. Digital platform companies
serve as role models for intra-organizational technolog-
ical adaption processes as well as important channels
for content distribution. Criticism regarding surveillance
does not emerge. Even among those interviewees who
feel committed to the idea of traditional journalism,
such as Axel Springer’s top-tier manager Ralph Büchi or
Belgian Publisher DePersgroep’s representative Piet Vro-
man, concepts as citizen (in contrast to consumer or
user) are not mentioned. Yet, the criticism that the inter-
viewed media managers direct toward the digital media
platforms is rather that the latter have exclusive access
to valuable data, resulting in a competitive advantage for
content-based media companies.
Following this, discourse on decentralization is an
issue for the interviewees. The widespread demand
is that control over user data was distributed more
equally across the media market. On a discursive level,
technology-related business strategies as presented by
the interviewees correspond to critical stands towards
centralized digital media platforms. Not throughout the
sample, yet quite visibly, interviewees suggest a coopera-
tion of Europeanmedia in order to build alternative tech-
nology infrastructure centers—both in terms of geogra-
phies of data collection and distribution. The content-
based media companies’ joining in decentralization dis-
course is particularly interesting because it expands an
old debate in a global direction. It was not long ago that
they themselves were the objects of criticism. Within na-
tional media systems, large content-driven media com-
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panies were regularly criticized for their growth and im-
pact on media markets. Another interesting aspect that
sheds light on decentralization processes is the interde-
pendency of both company types as the former deliver
content to be used or traded on digital platforms.
Thus, this study shows that it is worth discussing
(de)centralization from within a techno-economic per-
spective by looking at economic agents. It illustrates
that, even though content-based media companies suf-
fer from infrastructural disadvantages, they are not likely
to be “swallowed” by digital media platforms. The analy-
sis provides two arguments for that. First, we have shown
that content-based media companies’ links with digital
platform interfaces are diverse, some niche market com-
panies tend even to be independent. Especially in the
TV business, some refer to the pressure to be visible
on global platforms, while still relying on a variety of al-
ternative networks that support their business models.
Second, both companies and platforms depend on each
other regarding distribution and content. While Face-
book, Google or even Amazon, depend, to some extent,
on the provision of contribution by media professionals,
content-based media companies, can, especially when
not relying exclusively on relationships with digital plat-
forms, increase their revenue considerably.
Altogether, content-based media companies are
both agents of decentralization discourses and agents
of techno-economic regional centralization within the
(Western) informational ecosphere. Yet this study could
give only preliminary insights into media companies as
agents of (de)centralization as the issue emerged in the
course of the study (information on the research project
provided after peer review). A further promising avenue
of investigationmight bemedia company lobbyism in na-
tional, transnational, or global political institutions. Not
least, the interdependency of technology- and content-
based media companies is a promising field of research
as further insights might shift our perspective on legacy
media companies.
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Annex
Table 1. Interview Sample
No. Country Company Media type Interviewee(s) Position
1 AT ORF-Enterprise International content Broadcasting Beatrix Cox- CFO
sales for Austrian TV (audiovisual) Riesenfelder
market leader ORF
2 AT Mediaprint One of the biggest Publisher (print) Thomas Kralinger CEO
publishers of
newspapers in Austria
3 AT Austria Presse Leading news agency News Clemens Pig CEO
Agentur (APA) in Austria Agency
4 CH Diogenes Verlag Publisher of fiction Book Publisher Stephan Fritsch Managing
books from German- (print) Director
language and
international authors
5 DE Axel Springer Brands itself as “Europe’s Publisher Ralph Büchi President
leading digital publisher” (print) Inter-
dealing in newspapers national
and platforms
6 DE Vogel Business Publisher of trade Publisher Gunther Schunk CCO
Media publications (print) & Dieter Wendel M&A
Manager
7 DE ZDF Enterprises International TV- TV content Fred Burcksen & Managing





8 CH Highlight Holding with Rights trader Bernhard Burgener President
Communications subsidiaries in film
and sports licensing
9 CH Tamedia Leading Swiss media Publisher Marcel Kohler Managing
group, publishing and (print & digital) Director
digital platforms
10 DE DPA Leading German News Agency Michael Segbers CEO
news agency
11 DE Studio Hamburg One of the German TV content Johannes Züll Senior
Group leading production (audiovisual) Managing
and service centers Director
for film and television
12 DE Bertelsmann SE Diversified media, Multimedia Shobhna Mohn Executive
& Co. KGaA services and education company Vice
company including, President
inter alia, RTL Group Growth
and magazine publisher Regions
Gruner + Jahr
13 DE Motor Presse Publisher of special Publisher Dr. Volker Breid
Stuttgart GmbH interest (especially (print) CEO
& Co. KG automotive)
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Table 1. Interview Sample (cont.)
No. Country Company Media type Interviewee(s) Position
14 UK Elsevier Publisher of scientific Scientific Dr. Mark Siebert Director
(RELX group) journals and services publishing Engagement
Programs,
Strategy
15 UK ITV Studios UK’s biggest TV TV production Ella Umansky Managing
Limited production company Director
16 European European Alliance of PSM in Broadcasting Ingrid Deltenre General




17 USA Thomson Provides expert Information Gonzalo President
Reuters information in finance, broker Lissarague Global
economics and law, Growth
owns the Reuters Organization
news agency
18 USA Story House Produces primarily non- TV production Andreas Gutzeit Chief
Media Group fictional TV content in company Creative
the US and Germany (audiovisual) Officer
19 USA Time Warner Company focusing on TV and Film Manuel Urrutia Senior Vice
Inc. TV, TV networks, film content President,
and TV entertainment (audiovisual) International
and Corporate
Strategy
20 USA Tribune Content Distributes the print News agency Wayne Lown International
Agency (TCA; content provided by Sales
Teil von tronc) tronc newspapers Director
and others
21 USA Time Inc. Multi-platform media From Publisher Steve Marcopoto President,
company coming to multi-platform Time Inc.
sourcing from its company International
magazine brands
22 USA Discovery Distributing cable TV networks Jennifer Marburg Vice President
Networks networks as wells as and TV of Consumer




23 BE DePersgroep Multimedia company, Newspaper, Piet Vroman CFO
focus on newspapers magazines,
and magazines TV, Radio, Digital
24 DE Hubert Burda International multi- Magazines, Eckart Bollmann CEO Burda
Media media company platforms, events International
25 UK Time Inc. UK Content-Trader, From Marcus Rich CEO
Multi-Platform Media publisher to
and Related Business Multi-Platform
Corporation
26 ES Grupo Secuoya Largest independent TV Content José Miguel Head of
audiovisual group in (Audiovisual) Barrera international
the Spanish media
market
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